Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works

2010

Expansion and Contraction in Monopolization
Law.
Spencer Weber Waller
Loyola University Chicago, swalle1@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
Recommended Citation
Waller, Spencer Weber, Expansion and Contraction in Monopolization Law, 76 Antitrust L.J. 653 (2010)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION: EXPANSION AND
CONTRACTION IN MONOPOLIZATION LAW
MICHAL S. GAL*
AVISHALOM TOR**

SPENCER WEBER WALLER***
In the past decade, the question of what constitutes monopolizing
conduct once again has gained center stage in antitrust discourse after a
long period of relative dormancy. Enforcement agencies, courts, and
scholars alike have all attempted to draw a clear line between conduct
that a monopolist should be allowed to undertake and that which
should be prohibited.1 This task is by no means an easy one. The confer* Professor and Co-Director of the Forum for Law and Markets, University of Haifa
Faculty of Law. We would like to thank the Antitrust Law Journalfor making this Symposium possible and, in particular, would like to thank Andreas Reindl and Bruce Hoffman,
the JournatsSymposium editors, for their hard work and excellent editing of the contributions to this Symposium issue.
** Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the Forum for Law and Markets, University of
Haifa Faculty of Law.
*** Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I See, for instance, the extensive U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n Joint
Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Single-Firm Conduct as Related to Competition
(June 20, 2006-May 8, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/
singlejfirm/sfchearing.htm; European Comm'n, DG Competition Discussion Paperon the Application ofArticle 82 of the Treaty to ExclusionaryAbuses (2005), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf [hereinafter Commission Discussion
Paper]; European Comm'n, DG Competition, Communication from the Commission-Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Prioritiesin Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,2009 O.J. (C 45) 7 (Dec. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
Commission Guidance]; ECON. ADVISORY GRoup ON COMPETITION POLICY, REPORT ON AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC (July 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/studies/eagcpjuly_21_05.pdf [hereinafter EAGCP REPORT].
For some of the recent scholarly literature on this subject, see, e.g., ROBERT O'DONOGHUE
& A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC (2006); Thomas Eilmans-

berger, How to Distinguish Goodfrom Bad Competition Under Article 82 EC: In Search of Clearer
and More Coherent Standardsfor Anti-Competitive Abuses, 42 COMMON MARKET L. Rv. 129
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ence held at the University of Haifa on May 24-25, 2009, sought to address this monopolization debate.
Indeed, the varied themes developed in the present Symposium's essays and articles clearly illustrate the challenges presently facing monopolization law. Yet this brief commentary focuses on one particular facet
of current monopolization law that is manifested in a number of the
symposium articles-namely, its concomitant expansion and contraction processes. Monopolization prohibitions are proliferating worldwide, leading to the expansion of both enforcement activity and
scholarship examining this area of antitrust. However, this expansion
has been accompanied by a contraction of the scope of such prohibitions and the limits they impose on monopolists and dominant firms,
most notably in the United States and to a lesser degree in the European Union and elsewhere. 2 We suggest these seemingly contradictory
trends are at least partly complementary, resulting from the confluence
of global and domestic factors.
Until recently, the leading antitrust enforcers of the United States and
the European Union, as well as international institutions, such as the
OECD, the World Bank, and the International Competition Network
(ICN), mostly focused on cartels, both international and domestic, and
merger enforcement. The focus on cartels was driven, among other fac-

(2005); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 255
(2003); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral
Practices:A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CI. L. REv. 73 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 147 (2005); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of
the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623, 1624 (2005); Giorgio Monti,
The Concept of Dominance in Article 82, 2 EUR. COMPETrTONJ. 31 (2006); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 A-TRUST L.J. 311 (2006); John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1,
16-17 (1995).
As of December 1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon became effective and introduced a renumbering of the articles in the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Relevant
to the discussion here, Article 82 is now Article 102. However, for ease of reference, we
will continue to use the prior numbering in our discussion. Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, art. 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (effective Dec. 1, 2009)
[hereinafter EU Functioning Treaty].
2 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Illinois Tool
Works Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Peter Carstensen, False Positives in Identifying Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: ConceptualError,Business Reality, and Aspen, 2008 Wis.
L. REv. 295; Commission Guidance, supranote 1, 5 (stating that the Commission is moving
towards a more economic (or effects-based) approach in the Article 82 area).
3 See, e.g., International Competition Network, http://www.internationalcompetition
network.org; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), http:/
/www.oecd.org.
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tors, by broad consensus regarding the harm they generate; 4 the possibility of relying on simple legal tests, rather than complex economic
analyses, to condemn cartelizing behaviors;5 their significant negative
economic effects; 6 and the common interest of different jurisdictions in
enforcement against international cartels, with its positive spillover effects.7 The focus on mergers, on the other hand, has been driven by the
requirement of most merger regimes that enforcement agencies react
once a merger has been notified; 8 by the expansion of trade, which led
to several significant international mergers and acquisitions waves;9 and
by the growing need to reduce the high, duplicative costs of international merger review. 10

4 The Supreme Court noted in Trinko that cartels are "the supreme evil of antitrust."
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. See, e.g., OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD
CORE CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS,

DAFFE/COMP(2002)7 (Apr. 9, 2002) (on the harm created by cartels and the importance of appropriate sanctions) [hereinafter OECD REPORT].
5 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (reiterating that "[p]rice-fixing
agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing
agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful"). But see
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
49, 63 (2007) (arguing that "signs abound that the law of collaborative restraints of trade
is collapsing from both of its rule-bound poles-per se legality and per se illegalitytoward a flexible center").
6 See, e.g., Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels
and Developing Countries:Economic Effects and Implicationsfor Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 801 (2004); John Connor & Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern PrivateInternational
Cartels: 1990-2005 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=944039.
7 See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 4; Michal S. Gal, Free Movement ofJudgments: IncreasingDeterrenceof InternationalCartels ThroughJurisdictionalReliance, 51 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
8 See, e.g., ICN Merger Working Group, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/working-groups/current/merger.aspx.
9 Eileen Fumagalli & Helder Vasconcelos, Cross-BorderMerger Waves (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series No. 5601, Apr. 2006), http://www.ifn.se/
Wfiles/Vaxholm-06/fumagalli vasconcelos.pdf; Bernard S. Black, The First International
Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S. Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 799 (2000); Ajit Singh &
Rahul Dhumale, The Global Merger Wave: TransnationalCorporations,Global Policy Forum
(Nov. 1999), http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-transnationalcorporations/47146.html.
10See, e.g., Notification and Procedures Subgroup of the Merger Working Group, ICN,
Report on the Costs and Burdens of MultijurisdictionalMerger Review (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc332.pdf;
Bus. &
Indus. Advisory Comm. to the OECD & Int'l Chamber of Com., Recommended Frameworkfor
Best Practicesin InternationalMerger ControlProcedures (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.
biac.org/statemeits/comp/BIAC-ICCMergerPaper.pdf; William J. Rowley & A. Neil
Campbell, A Comment on the Estimated Costs of Multi-JurisdictionalMerger Reviews, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Sept. 2003, at 1, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/03/09/comment.
pdf.
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Many of the factors that facilitated interest and expanded enforcement in the cartel.and merger areas, however, have had the opposite
effect where monopolization was concerned. There has been little consensus, for instance, regarding which unilateral conduct of monopolies
and dominant firms is anticompetitive" and which, if any, remedies
were appropriate. 12 Moreover, the simpler legal tests that were once applied in this area have fallen from favor, first in U.S. antitrust and later
in EU competition law, after having been criticized for their over-inclusiveness and lack of clear guiding foundations.13 Consequently, enforcement in the unilateral conduct area became all the more difficult and
contentious. These difficulties were exacerbated, moreover, by the conflicting interests of different jurisdictions in the monopolization context
due to the potential for negative effects of foreign enforcement actions
4
against one's domestic firms.'
Nevertheless, over time, other global and domestic factors-including
increased levels of international trade and the growth and strengthening of dominant international firms, the worldwide proliferation of antitrust regimes with their attendant spillover effects, liberalization of
markets which brought to the forefront dominant firms that were formerly state-controlled or otherwise highly regulated, and the growing
economic importance of dynamically competitive industries-combined
to make monopolization again a focal point of scholarly interest and
5
enforcement activity.'
Monopolization law gained importance due to increased levels of
trade and the opening of borders, which helped large multinational
firms become key players in many jurisdictions. 6 Because multinational
firms sometimes dominate and exploit markets in developing jurisdictions, such jurisdictions seek tools to reduce their exploitation, also
turning to monopolization prohibitions that may even become the corn See,

e.g., supra note 1.

12Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Futureof Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST

L.J. 11 (2008).

13See, e.g., supra note 1.
14 WILLIAM

H.

PAGE &JOHN

E.

LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECH-

(2007); Nicholas Economides & loannis Lianos, The
Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the
NOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE

Microsoft Cases, 76

ANTITRUST

L.J. 483 (2009).

15The role monopolization prohibitions plays in convincing the public in newer anti-

trust jurisdictions to adopt antitrust laws is another contributing force, although many of
these jurisdictions do not apply their laws in practice against dominant international
firms. See Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges
Faced
by Small and by DevelopingJurisdictions,33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (2009).
16
ELEANOR M. Fox, LAWRENCE A. SULLVAN & RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 278 (2d ed. 2004).
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nerstone of their new antitrust law.17 This dynamic also motivated developing jurisdictions to request that the subject be put on the ICN
agenda.18
A related concern is reflected in the statement of Christine Varney,
the Assistant Attorney General*for Antitrust at the U.S. Department of
Justice, that "unless we ... can sit at the table and jointly continue to
pursue the evolution of ... Section 2, I think we are going to cede this
territory to the Europeans entirely and we're not [going to] have a
whole lot to say about what abuse of dominance looks like for a global
firm."' 9 This statement acknowledges the limits of national governance.
The jurisdiction with the strictest regulation that can also create a credible threat of enforcement may impact both the worldwide conduct of
international firms and domestic consumer welfare.
Another important factor involves the liberalization of previously
highly regulated industries, many of which involve dominant firms. Such
a liberalization process has occurred in the past two decades, for instance, in Eastern Europe, as well as in some countries in South America
and Asia, which experienced a transition from centrally planned regimes to more market-oriented ones. 20 Indeed, studies of these jurisdictions often indicate that the most important issue they face in the
introduction of competition into their markets involves the regulation
of previously state-controlled or closely regulated industries, and much
greater effort is directed towards regulating such firms than towards cartels or merger enforcement. 2'
17 Mostjurisdictions that adopted an antitrust regime have prohibitions against monopolization. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical
Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2007);
Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust World Reports, http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/
index.php/MainPage; ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/unilateral.aspx.
18The subject was added to the ICN agenda in 2006.
19Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the American Antitrust Institute Annual Conference, Panel on Re-energizing
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/archives/files/20080619_pv aai06l908holemanbreakout_020320091323.mp3.
20 See, e.g., MAR10 OJALA, THE COMPETITION LAW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
(1999) (providing a summary of Central and Eastern European countries' transition to
competition laws that are closely aligned with EU competition law); OECD, COMPETITION
LAw AND POLICY IN BALTIC COUNTRIES (1999).
21 On the problem of pre-existing monopolies and central state regulation of their economic power in Central and Eastern European countries, see, e.g., Tibor Varady, The
Emergence of Competition Law in (Former)Socialist Countries,47 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 252-56,
261-62 (1999). On such problems in Latin America, see, e.g., COMPETITrON POLICY, DEREGULATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Moisrs Naim & Joseph S. Tulchin
eds., 1999).
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These developments in the international arena also have coincided
with the increased economic significance of dynamically competitive,
new economy industries.22 The common characteristics of these industries-such as high rates of innovation, network effects, and the centrality of IP rights-sometimes lead to concentrated market structures with
dominant firms. Thus, high rates of innovation may be an advantage for
large firms that are able to make continued investments in research and
development. Network effects, which reflect economies of scale in consumption, similarly benefit large networks over small ones and may lead
to competition among platforms for an unavoidable dominant position
in the market. 23 Furthermore, new economy industries also typically rely
on IP protection to facilitate investment in innovation-related activities,
which in turn increases the likelihood of dominance. 24 In these markets,
therefore, the need to address the monopolization challenge is all the
greater. Hence, it is not surprising that the same high-profile cases that
helped re-ignite the international interest in abuse of dominance, such
as Microsoft and Intel, as well as the recent European Commission investigation involving Google, 25 also concerned those dynamically competitive
industries.
These multiple factors have combined to increase both the international reach of monopolization law and its economic significance. However, the increased role of economic analysis in antitrust generally and
monopolization specifically has led to both a rationalization of monopoly law and a contraction of its scope.2 6 This contraction has taken place,
most notably, in both the United States and the European Union, albeit

22 See, e.g, Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and IntellectualProperty, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2001) (examining the high-tech sector); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001)
(considering the software, Internet, and communications industries); Christian Ahlborn
et al., DG Comp's Discussion Paper on Article 82: Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries (Mar. 2006) (referring
to the high-tech and innovation industries), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competi
tion/antitrust/art82/057.pdf.
23 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 105-06 (describing the phenomenon of "tipping"-that
is, "the tendency of one system to pull away from its rivals in popularity once it has gained
an initial edge."); see generallyJoseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1998);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network EconomicEffects, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 479 (1998).
24E.g., Ahlborn et al., supra note 22.
21SeeJames Kanter, New Complaints Filed Against Google in Europe, Feb. 24, 2010, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/technology/companies/25antitrust.html.
2
6 See supra note 1.

HeinOnline -- 76 Antitrust L.J. 658 2009-2010

2010]

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

to different extents that reflect these regimes' different values, beliefs,
and relevant legal frameworks.
The contraction of the scope of unilateral conduct regulation in U.S.
antitrust law has been spearheaded by scholarly critique that revealed
how common legal formulae in this area had little clear meaning and
scope and were lacking a rational foundation. 27 These criticisms were
then incorporated into Supreme Court jurisprudence that posed increasingly stringent hurdles for antitrust plaintiffs alleging monopolization. 28 Moreover, a contraction has also been manifested in the
significant reduction of enforcement activity in this area in recent decades, despite a small number of highly visible cases that were still pur29
sued by the agencies.
In Europe, the contraction of unilateral conduct regulation has been
more recent, more equivocal, and less dramatic than its U.S. counterpart. The Member States engaged in a debate, led by the Commission,
seeking to review the basis and the content of the abuse of dominance
prohibition.3 The resultant guidance indicated a more economically
oriented approach, which gives less weight to legal presumptions of
abuse and emphasizes an analysis of the effects of specific conduct in a
given case.31 This European debate also has led to the understanding
that at least some past legal rules must be contracted in order to ensure
that the Treaty of Rome meets its goals.3 2 Furthermore, many of the
abuse of dominance prohibitions adopted around the world are based
on the Treaty,3 3 and small, transition, or less developed jurisdictions
27 Id.
28 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Illinois Tool Works
Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
29Such cases include, inter alia, Microsoft and Intel. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel, Comm'n Decision (May 13, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel-provisional-decision.pdf.
30See EAGCP REPORT, supra note 1; Commission DiscussionPaper,supra note 1; Commission
Guidance, supra note 1.
31 Id.
32
Although, notably, Member States at the same time retained the right to have more
stringent laws on the abuse of dominance under Article 82. At the EU level, the white
paper met a complicated political response and, ultimately, was only partially reflected in
the resulting enforcement guidelines. See, e.g., Ariel Ezrachi, The European Commission Guidance on Article 82 EC-The Way in Which Institutional Realities Limit the Potentialfor Reformn
(Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2009, Aug. 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract= 1463854.
33 Many jurisdictions have transplanted Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated text), art. 82, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (321E) 37. A re-
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sometimes rely on the case law and academic studies from large, developed jurisdictions for their decisions.3 4 The contraction in the scope of
liability under monopolization prohibitions in the United States and the
European Union may therefore generate some spillover effects in other
jurisdictions as well.
Yet the overall contraction of monopolization law in these leading jurisdictions might serve to facilitate, rather than inhibit, its expansion
and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes
with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved
in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach also has made its refinement and rationalization all the
more important for jurisdictions seeking to avoid the harmful chilling
effects associated with excessive enforcement in this area.
Contraction also might be motivated by external pressures, resulting
from spillover effects.3 5 Most importantly, foreign monopolization
prohibitions may affect the conduct of international firms in other markets in which they operate, due to linkages among their activities in different jurisdictions. Such linkages exist, for example, when the
production, design, or marketing of differentiated products in different
jurisdictions are too costly due to scale economies.16 Linkages also may
result from the need to realize network effects that require that consumers use similar products. 37 In such cases, a prohibition that prevents
firms from engaging in certain conduct (e.g., quality-increasing technological integration) in one jurisdiction might affect consumers in other
jurisdictions as well. Notably, concerns over spillover effects on the production and worldwide sale of products with similar quality garnered
much international attention following such high-profile cases as
Microsoft and Inte 8 These spillover effects create external pressures to
view by the authors reveals that these include, inter alia, the twenty-seven EU Member
States and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greenland, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Serbia-Montenegro, and Namibia. Eight additional jurisdictions followed the EU provisions, with minor changes: Albania, Armenia, Jersey, Macedonia, Mauritius, Singapore, Uruguay,
Venezuela. See, e.g., Hylton & Deng, supra note 17 (which includes references to the text
of the antitrust laws of most jurisdictions).
34Michal S. Gal & Jorge Padilla, The Follower Phenomenon: Implicationsfor the Design of
Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, infra this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (2010); see
also Michal S. Gal, The "Cut and Paste" of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditionsfor a
Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J.L. REFORM 467 (2007).
35 Gal & Padilla, supra note 34.
36 Id.
37 Id.; see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (briefly discussing network
effects).
38 At least until the recent announcement by Microsoft that it will sell differentiated
products in different markets.
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apply monopolization prohibitions only where justified by efficiency
concerns.
All in all, our analysis here suggests that the expansion and contraction of monopolization law may be at least partly complementary, rather
than wholly contradictory. A better understanding and evaluation of
these trends is therefore likely to necessitate theirjoint, rather than separate, evaluation in future antitrust scholarship of which this Symposium
is merely the beginning.
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